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ABSTRACT  
 
On the 21
st
 of December 2007, Jerónimo Martins announced that it was acquiring the 
Plus Discount chain of stores in Poland and in Portugal. This was an excellent 
opportunity to strengthen even more the leading position of Jerónimo Martins in the 
hard discount sector of the Polish retail market, through the chain Biedronka.  
This case study will analyze the main motives for this acquisition and contextualize it in 
the strategy of Jerónimo Martins for Poland. The main elements of the valuation of the 
chain Plus Discount will also be discussed throughout the case.  
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Introduction 
On the 2
nd
 of December 2007, the CEO of Jerónimo Martins, Luís Palha da Silva, was 
returning to Portugal with a lot to reflect. A company Board meeting had been 
scheduled for the following day, and the final decision for the acquisition of the chain of 
stores Plus Discount had to be presented.  
The take off from the Warsaw Frederic Chopin airport in Poland, concluded Luís Palha 
da Silva’s one week visit of the operations of Jerónimo Martins in that country, where 
he could once again witness the success of the chain Biedronka. During the flight to 
Lisbon he wondered if the acquisition of the 210 stores of Plus Discount in Poland was 
the right move, given that the leadership of Biedronka in the Polish retail market was 
supported by an impressive growth of stores made exclusively through organic growth. 
Moreover, he was considering if this acquisition might not be as profitable as having 
launched the stores from scratch, and also if the integration process could be done in an 
effective way. However, all these stores could end up in the hands of one of the direct 
competitors of the firm.   
Besides this dilemma there was also the issue of the price to offer for the whole chain. It 
had to be higher than what was being offered by the other firms interested in the deal 
and also enough to please the owners of Plus Discount, but it could not be excessive, in 
order to render the operation profitable. Bearing that in mind, he knew that some 
difficult issues of the valuation, such as the total synergies, the number of years before 
the Plus stores would reach the operational level of Biedronka and the costs of 
restructuring, had to be taken into account. 
 
Jerónimo Martins 
The history of Jerónimo Martins goes back to the distant year of 1792, when a young 
Galician, hoping for better days, came to Lisbon and opened a small and modest 
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gourmet shop in Chiado. A few years later, the store had become a great success, 
supplying many embassies, ships and even the Portuguese Royal House.  
Although Jerónimo Martins had started out as a simple store that just sold sacks of 
wheat and corn, sausages, bottles of wine and many other ordinary products, by the end 
of 2007 it had become one of the most important Portuguese retailers, achieving only in 
this year total sales of over 5.3 billion Euros. During this period it had expanded its 
activities not only into other areas, but also into other countries, particularly to Brazil, 
the United Kingdom and mainly Poland, always maintaining its core business as food, 
as  is portrayed in its mission statement: “We know about food”.  
At the end of 2007 Jerónimo Martins had diversified its activities in Portugal within 
three major areas: distribution, manufacturing and services (Exhibit 1), the first area 
representing 95% of total sales. In this area it has three different chains, Pingo Doce, 
Feira Nova and Recheio. The first one operates in the food retail sector through the 
format of supermarket and is the leader with 1.136 million Euros in 2007, ahead of 
Continente with 1.133 million Euros. The second one is in the same sector, but through 
mini-hyper and hypermarkets, and occupies the third place following the two chains 
mentioned above with 800 million Euros in sales. The last one is a wholesale 
distribution company that operates under the cash & carry format, being the leader of its 
kind with sales of 626 million Euros.   
In the manufacturing sector Jerónimo Martins has a joint-venture with Unilever, which 
allows them to have the biggest Portuguese industrial group in fast moving consumer 
goods and leadership brands in diverse markets like oil, margarine, ice tea and others. 
Through the services sector Jerónimo Martins owns the Hussel retail chain of 
chocolates and is responsible for representing other international companies in the food 
and cosmetic areas in Portugal.  
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International expansion 
In 1995, Jerónimo Martins decided to expand its operation to Poland. The desire for 
internationalization was explained by the feeling that Portugal was not enough for the 
wishes and plans of expansion that the owners had for the firm. The choice for this 
country is justified by several different facts. The first one is its size. Poland, with a 
population of 38 million, was the 8
th
 biggest country in Europe and the 3
rd
 in Eastern 
Europe, only surpassed by Russia and the Ukraine. Furthermore, the future expectations 
for this country were also very important. There were great perspectives of future 
economic development and it was only a few years away from becoming a member of 
the European Union.  
Another decisive factor for the decision to move to Poland was the appearance of a 
specific opportunity worth pursuing. This opportunity arose from a contact through a 
Polish businessman that was the owner of a chain of cash & carry, Eurocash. This 
format being particularly well known to Jerónimo Martins, constituted an even greater 
incentive to really pursue the expansion to this country. Consequently, together with an 
English company named Booker, with which Jerónimo Martins already had a 
partnership for some years, the company moved ahead to the acquisition of Eurocash.  
Following this investment, in 1997 Jerónimo Martins decided to make a new acquisition 
once again through the same Polish contact. This time it was the company Biedronka, 
which operated in the format of discount through 243 stores. An investment of this 
magnitude reflected the company’s determination and confidence in the success of the 
Polish operations. In the following three years Biedronka opened more than 300 stores 
in Poland. Once again this operation was made through a partnership, only this time 
with a Polish group that became responsible for choosing the locations of the stores, 
building them and then starting the operations. 
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One year after the acquisition of Biedronka, Jerónimo Martins launched the first hyper 
market Jumbo in Poland, allowing the company to operate simultaneously in three 
different formats just a few years after starting the operations in Poland. 
During that period the company also expanded its operations to other countries. In 1996 
it acquired the British chain of sports Lillywhites that was the property of the Queen of 
England and in 1997 the Brazilian supermarkets Sé (exhibit 2). This was a period of 
great success for Jerónimo Martins, the value of their stock was rising very quickly and 
the atmosphere felt in the firm at the time was one of great euphoria related to this 
international expansion. Even the banks were approaching the company offering to 
finance any projects that they might have.    
Restructuring 
However, despite the impressive international expansion and the very optimistic 
scenario, things gradually started to become more difficult. Not only the lack of 
knowledge about the Polish market, but also of the discount format, was making the 
expansion much harder than what had been anticipated. Adding to that was the 
inaccuracy in the forecasts on the level of competition. In fact, between 1995 and 2000 
almost all of the main international operators of this type of market entered Poland 
(exhibit 3). All this led to the failure of the first estimates, which were considered to be 
very optimistic given the real conditions.   
Following the first difficulties in Poland, things got worse at the beginning of the new 
millennium. The global crisis that was happening at that time was creating adversities 
for every operation of Jerónimo Martins. The first symptom was the drop in the 
profitability in the activities of the firm, which was reflected in problems of liquidity 
and also in the value of its stock. During that period the Group faced serious financial 
problems not only caused by the global crisis and specific problems in each country, but 
also by a very rapid international expansion for which the company did not seem to be 
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prepared, at least in financial terms. This situation culminated in the inability of the firm 
to pay the interest on its debt.  
Facing these problems, Jerónimo Martins decided to go ahead with an issue of stock of 
300 million Euros, together with the restructuring of the firm. The objective of this 
restructuring was to alienate the non-profitable areas, in order to obtain some needed 
funds for the company and mainly to allow it to concentrate on its core areas. In 2001 
some Portuguese operations owned by Jerónimo Martins i.e. Vidago, Melgaço and 
Pedras Salgadas were sold to Unicer, and in 2002 it was the British company 
Lillywhites that was sold to Sports Soccer.  
Nonetheless, the cash received was not enough to solve all the problems and therefore, 
there was the need to move for the alienation of some of the core assets. So, that same 
year it sold the Sé supermarkets in Brazil and the Jumbo hypermarkets in Poland, and in 
2004 the firm Eurocash was sold. All these firms had not achieved the expected results, 
however due to the fact that they were still in a launching phase, there was still the 
possibility of them becoming a success. 
Once the process of restructuring had been concluded, everyone at Jerónimo Martins 
felt that this had not only been necessary, but also extremely useful. It allowed the 
company to reduce its debt significantly, to return to profitability and mainly to focus 
exclusively on its core business again, maintaining only one international business unit, 
which was Biedronka. 
 
Biedronka  
Biedronka is a chain of retail stores, owned by Jerónimo Martins, that operates under 
the discount format, which means the practice of lower prices than those in the 
traditional retail stores. 
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During the difficult period that Jerónimo Martins went through from 1999 until 2003, 
this was the unit that had managed to grow and expand its activities successfully. Since 
the acquisition in 1997, Biedronka had achieved the leading position in the hard 
discount sector of the Polish retail market, holding about two thirds of this sector. 
One of the fundamental aspects for this leadership was the impressive pace in opening 
new stores. By 2001 it had opened 620 stores and by the end of 2004 it already had 
more than 700. In exhibit 4 we can see the number of stores opened each year and in 
exhibit 5 the number of stores of the direct competitors by the end of 2007. This bet on 
a high number of stores is one of the main features of the strategy of Biedronka. This is 
considered to be an important advantage against the competition, since a larger number 
of stores will imply higher economies of scale and bigger volumes of goods ordered 
from the suppliers, which consequently will provide the firm with lower prices. In this 
manner Biedronka is capable of practicing lower prices against competition. Its 
importance is also reflected in a higher proximity to the clients that not only offers the 
consumer quicker access to the stores, but also works as publicity.  
The strategy of communication was also important. Biedronka developed a very 
effective communication with the consumers, aptly conveying the message of the low 
prices. The firm has developed the slogan “Everyday low prices” and other publicity 
campaigns that have received important Polish brand awards. Their success is expressed 
in the fact that Biedronka has a substantial lead in terms of brand awareness over the 
competition. Another important aspect of the strategy is the concern with the level of 
operating efficiency, which is fundamental for controlling the costs of the operations.  
At the end of 2007, not only has the company been able to maintain a leading position 
in the hard discount sector of the Polish market, but has also strengthened it. The 
number of stores increased to 1.045, with sales of 2.392 million Euros, which 
represented an increase of 35% over the last year of 2006 (Exhibit 6). Furthermore, over 
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the last years the Jerónimo Martins distribution in Poland has increased its weight 
within the whole group. As we can see in the exhibits 7, 8 and 9, since 2003 Biedronka 
has increased its sales strongly, achieving in 2007 44.7% of total sales and 46.85% of 
total employees. Over the years the portfolio of sales has been comprised of about 80% 
of food products. 
 
A new opportunity for acquisition  
In the second semester of 2007 an opportunity for acquisition appeared for Biedronka. 
This possibility was related to the potential sale of the chain of stores Plus discount, 
which was a direct competitor in the hard discount sector.  
This was in fact a revival of the interest of Jerónimo Martins in Plus Discount that dated 
back to 2003. By this time Biedronka was facing problems with getting new licenses for 
its new stores, due to limitations imposed by the Ministry of Interior in granting these 
licenses to foreign firms. Facing this problem, Jerónimo Martins decided to follow the 
activities of companies like Plus Discount, Lidl and Leader Price in Poland more 
closely, and considered a possible acquisition that could allow Biedronka to continue its 
expansion. However, in 2004 with the entrance of Poland in the European Union the 
limitations imposed by the Ministry had to be lifted, and consequently the interest in an 
acquisition decreased.  
This interest was suddenly revived when in the second semester of 2007 some rumours 
started to circulate, saying that the Plus Discount operations owned by the German 
company Tengelmann were for sale in countries such as Hungary, the Czech Republic, 
Spain and Poland. These rumours were later confirmed when Plus was sold to Carrefour 
in Spain in July 2007, and also when some banks approached Jerónimo Martins with the 
information that Tengelmann was interested in selling their operations in Poland. This 
interest was justified by two reasons, the first was the change of focus in their core 
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business to real-estate, and the second was related to the low success of the brand Plus 
in the Polish market, caused by their inability to achieve a high scale of efficiency that 
could allow them to compete with the other discount brands such as Biedronka, Lidl and 
Netto. 
 
Plus Discount 
Plus Discount is a chain owned by the German company Tengelmann, which is the 
fourth largest retail supermarket and distribution group in the world. With 7.700 stores 
that range from hypermarkets to discount markets and drugstores, this company has 
spread all over Europe in countries such as Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, France 
and Poland, and to the United States and Canada. Tengelmann is the owner of many 
brands i.e. Plus, A&P, OBI, Kik and Kaiser.    
The chain of stores Plus, due to its discount format, is a direct competitor of Biedronka 
in the hard discount sector. By the end of 2007 it had stores in seven different European 
countries, including Portugal and Poland. It entered the Polish market in 1996 and in the 
end of 2007 it had 210 stores, with 435.6 million Euros in sales. In exhibit 10 more 
detailed information about the operations of Plus at the end of 2007 can be found.  
 
Macroeconomic context in Poland 
At the end of 2007 Poland was one of the fastest growing economies in Europe. In the 
last two years it had been able to reduce the gap between the European Union and the 
OECD countries. By registering a growth above 6% in this period, Poland had reached 
the best economic performance since the late 1990s and also the second best 
performance in the OECD. The main reasons for this growth are the very significant rise 
in the expenditures made by the Polish consumers and also the increase in the level of 
the investments. The first one can be explained by the increasing employment, wages 
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and remittances of emigrants, and the second by the infusion of direct foreign 
investment and of European structural funds that have been used to co-finance public 
and private investments.  
This strong economic growth has been fundamental to gradually improve the general 
level of live of the Polish population. In 1995 when Jerónimo Martins began its 
investment in this country, most of the population had low wages, lived in small houses 
and did not have enough income to afford goods beyond the ones of first need. For 
example, the number of cars at that time was very small. Nevertheless, with the 
economic development these indicators have been progressively improving.   
In 2007 the behaviour of the inflation suffered a change. As opposed to recent years 
where inflation had recorded low values, in the present year and for the next years it is 
expected to suffer a relevant increase. This is due essentially to the food and energy 
shocks, and the economy’s growth. The average value of the Zloty in 2007 was 0.28 
Euros, which corresponds to an appreciation of 5.8%. Current expectations point for 
further appreciation of the Polish currency.  
In Exhibit 11 we can find relevant data related to Polish economic aspects, mainly the 
values of the GDP, of inflation and of net exports. 
 
Retail Food Market – Poland 
The Polish retail food market is considered to be the most interesting in Central and 
Eastern Europe for many years in the future, as companies can take advantage of the 
economic development and of the political stability. In 2007 the retail food market in 
Poland showed strong signs of development again, achieving a growth in the order of 
the two digits, surpassing 220 billion zlotys. This is a trend that has been increasing 
rapidly in the last fifteen years, together with the overall tendency of the economy.  
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One very characteristic point of the Polish retail food market is its high degree of 
competition, expressed in a high number of companies present in this market, mainly 
international operations. The number of firms present is one of the highest in Europe, 
which implicates a very aggressive and competitive environment and also a great 
pressure on the prices. As we can see in exhibit 12, the market is very fragmented, 
having ten top retailers that own approximately 92% of the total market. As a result of 
this, there is an intensive movement of consolidation. For example, in 2007 there were 
various consolidating actions in the small domestic retail chains, with the acquisition of 
some regional chains by the Emperia Group, which is a Polish retail and wholesale 
company. In the previous year, the firms Julius Meinl, Casino and Ahold, sold their 
operations in Poland to Tesco, Metro and Carrefour respectively.  
Another important feature is the role of the organic growth, which every company 
considers to be one of its priorities. This is confirmed by the high number of new stores 
opened in the last years. In 2005 it is estimated that 250 new stores were opened, in 
2006 they were more than 250 and in 2007 more than 200 just in the discount format. 
If we look at exhibit 13, we can conclude that the market is divided almost perfectly 
among the three main types of format, hypermarkets holding the biggest share, followed 
by the discount and the supermarkets. A different format that has a small part compared 
to the last three is the cash & carry. 
Observing the tables of exhibits 14 and 15, we can see the ten most important food 
retailers in Poland, which correspond to the main competitors of Jerónimo Martins. First 
we can highlight the company Lidl & Schwarz, which is the second player in terms of 
sales in the discount format, the same as Biedronka. Not mentioned in the table, but also 
operating in this format is the firm Netto that is smaller than both Biedronka and Lidl. 
In the beginning of 2008 the German group Aldi is also expected to enter into this 
segment. Outside the discount format we can highlight some important companies like 
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Metro, Spolem and Tesco. Metro is a German company that has its third most important 
international market in Poland. Spolem is a Polish group that works as a cooperative 
network of more than 4000 independent stores of different sizes, but predominantly 
supermarkets. Tesco is the largest British retailer and the leading operator in the Polish 
hypermarket sector.  
To finalize, it is important to mention that the referred companies have been increasing 
their operations using a mixture between organic growth and consolidation, which has 
been able to give the firms a fast increase in the total number of stores throughout 
Poland.        
 
The Deal 
Jerónimo Martins decided to show interest in a possible acquisition of Plus Discount 
and started conversations with the banks that had approached them offering this 
possibility. The information that the banks had to give was just a teaser to notify the 
intention of Tengelmann and what assets it wanted to sell, the financial information that 
it contained was much reduced. Despite that, the company decided to go ahead and 
signed a non-disclosure agreement in order to receive more detailed financial 
information about Plus.  
After looking carefully at this new data, Jerónimo Martins took some time to decide if 
they really would like to proceed, since the next phase would imply high costs with 
teams of auditors and lawyers. Bearing that in mind, it carefully analyzed both the 
financial information and the location of the stores. For this last type of analysis, it was 
important to check each store individually in order to assess its potential, because in this 
type of acquisition a company is essentially buying the location of the stores. So, every 
factor that might influence this, such as  the amount of people living in the 
surroundings, the traffic passing by, if it is located in an urban center, the  accessibility, 
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the existence of a parking lot and the proximity to existent stores of Biedronka had to be 
taken into account. 
After making the evaluation, the managers of Jerónimo Martins concluded that although 
not all of the stores had great potential, they were good enough to advance with a non-
binding offer. This offer was accepted by Tengelmann and now a binding-offer had to 
be prepared. By this time there were other companies interested in the acquisition, 
however Jerónimo Martins did not know who or how many they were.  
To create the binding-offer all the firms had access to a data-room, where further 
confidential information about Plus Discount was available. Jerónimo Martins 
assembled a team that had people from the firm, together with auditors and lawyers to 
check every bit of information that was accumulated in several piles in the room. The 
objective of the team was to verify if this new information would affect the valuation 
made for the previous offer, for example, they might find contracts that could impose a 
payment of a significant amount in the future, or a lawsuit that might imply a positive 
cash-flow. Therefore, the binding-offer could have a positive or negative correction 
relatively to the non-binding, depending on the information analyzed in the data-room.        
 
After the acquisition 
On the 21
st
 of December of 2007 Jerónimo Martins announced the acquisition of the 
Plus Discount chain of stores, not only in Poland but also in Portugal, paying a total of 
320 million Euros. In Poland the Plus stores were integrated into the Biedronka chain 
and in Portugal into Pingo Doce. In exhibit 16 the effect of the acquisition in the market 
shares in the Polish hard discount sector is portrayed.   
At that time the reaction of the analysts was very positive, for example, the BPI equity 
research said: “… Overall, we are confident that this acquisition will create value for 
JMAR and reinforce our positive stance on the stock… this acquisition will allow JMAR 
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to eliminate one of its main competitors (especially in Poland), increasing the 
consolidation level of both retail markets…we believe this move will create a significant 
amount of synergies in both countries, especially in terms of procurement, logistics and 
marketing…”. A comment was added that the price paid for the operation was 
reasonable.   
However, during the following year the macroeconomic context changed completely. 
The economic crisis initiated in the financial markets was responsible for the 
contraction of the economies all around the World, and modified the expectations for 
the macroeconomic figures. Comparing exhibit 12 with 17, we can observe the changes 
in the forecasts for the Polish GDP and for the values of inflation. The projection for the 
GDP was revised in a very negative way, and despite the economic growth being 
positive, it is expected that it will suffer a significant slowdown. As a result the value of 
the inflation is also expected to decrease, and the high values predicted at the end of 
2007 for the following years are now much lower.  
This change in the macroeconomic context may affect the value given to Plus Discount 
at the end of 2007. Some of the assumptions made when the valuation was first done, 
are now completely inaccurate, consequently it is expected that if the valuation is made 
with the macroeconomic conditions of the beginning of 2009, the value of the firm will 
not be the same.        
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Exhibits 
Exhibit 1 – Areas of Jerónimo Martins    
 
Exhibit 2 – Timeline with foreign investment of Jerónimo Martins  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 3 – Entry years of the companies in the Polish retail market 
Year of entry 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 2000 2001 2002 
Company Billa Makro Hit 
Globi 
J. Martins 
Savia 
Geant  
Leclerc 
Plus 
Real 
Jumbo 
Auchan 
Carrefour 
Hypernova 
Intermarché 
Tesco Leader price 
Champion 
Kaukland Lidl 
1995 
 Expansion to 
Poland: 
acquisition of 
Eurocash 
1996 
 Expansion to 
the UK: 
acquisition of 
Lillywhites 
 Expansion to 
Brazil: 
acquisition of Sé 
supermarkets;  
 Acquisition of 
Biedronka in 
Poland 
1997 
 Opening of 
the first 
Jumbo 
hypermarket 
in Poland 
1998 
 Alienation of 
Lillywhites, of Sé 
supermarkets 
and of Jumbo 
hypermarkets in 
Poland 
2002 
 Alienation 
of Eurocash 
2004 
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Exhibit 4 – Number of stores of Biedronka 
Source: Biedronka 
 
 
 
Exhibit 5 – Number of stores of the direct competitors of Biedronka in the hard discount sector in the 
end of 2007 
 
Company Netto Plus Discount Lidl 
Nº of stores 136 210 281 
 
 
 
Exhibit 6 – Economic and financial indicators of Biedronka 
Biedronka 1st Semester 2nd Semester 
PLN'000 2007 2006  % 2007 2006  % 
Number of Stores 962 834 1.045 905 
New 64 36 156 116 
Closed 7 7 16 16 
Remodeled 25 30 71 57 
Sales Area 486.487 412.042 18,1% 536.729 452.952 18,5% 
Weighted Sales Area 464.886 399.352 16,4% 482.455 411.723 17,2% 
  
Store Sales 4.065.427 3.068.622 32,5% 8.969.377 6.638.213 35,1% 
Sales / sqm 8,75 7,68 13,8% 18,59 16,12 15,3% 
Sales Like for Like 19,2% 21,1% 
Source: Biedronka 
Years 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Nº Stores 243 373 579 592 621 638 672 725 805 905 1.045 
Variation 243 130 206 13 29 17 34 53 80 100 140 
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Exhibit 7 – Growth of the sales and sales per sqm of the business units of Jerónimo Martins  
 
Exhibit 8 – Nº of stores and sales area 
 
Exhibit 9 – Sales of the sectors of Jerónimo Martins   
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Exhibit 10 – Plus Discount information 
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 11 – Poland Macroeconomic data 
Source: OECD 
 
 
Poland 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
 Gross domestic product -  volume -  market prices 5,3 3,6 6,2 6,5 5,6 5,2 
 Private final consumption expenditure -  volume 4,7 2,1 5,0 6,1 6,2 6,1 
 Government final consumption expenditure -  volume 3,1 5,2 6,1 1,5 1,9 2,0 
 Exports of goods and services -  volume 14,0 7,9 14,6 8,9 8,3 8,6 
 Imports of goods and services -  volume 15,7 4,7 17,4 13,5 12,3 11,5 
 Unemployment rate - as a percentage of labor force 19,0 17,7 13,8 9,6 8,4 7,7 
 General government financial balance -  as a percentage of GDP -5,7 -4,3 -3,8 -2,0 -3,2 -3,0 
 Consumer price index 3,4 2,2 1,3 2,5 3,6 4,2 
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Exhibit 12 – Market share of each company in Polish retail market 
 
Source: IGD 
Exhibit 13 – Retail market by type 
 
Source: IGD 
Exhibit 14 – Top 10 Retailers 2006 
 
36%
32%
30%
2%
Hypermarket
Discount
Supermarket
Cash & Carry
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Exhibit 15 – Companies and their respective brands in the Polish retail market 
Company Brand Format 
Metro Makro Cash & Carry 
Metro Real Hypermarket 
Spolem Spolem Supermarket 
J. Martins Biedronka Discount 
Tesco Tesco Hypermarket 
Tesco Savia Supermarket 
Auchan Auchan Hypermarket 
Auchan Elea Supermarket 
Carrefour Carrefour Hypermarket 
Carrefour Champion Supermarket 
Lidl & Schwarz Lidl Discount 
Rewe Billa Supermarket 
Leclerc Leclerc Hypermarket 
Eurocash Eurocash Cash & Carry 
Lewiatan Lewiatan Supermarket 
 
 
Exhibit 16 – Effect of the acquisition of Plus by Biedronka 
 
 
Source: BPI equity research  
16,60%
8,20%
0,50%
74,70%
Polish hard-discounters market share (1H08)
Lidl (Schwarz)
Netto (Dansk 
Supermarked)
Aldi
Biedronka (JM)
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Exhibit 17 – Macroeconomic data for Poland in the end of 2008 
Poland 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 Gross domestic product -  volume -  market prices 6,7 5,4 3,0 3,5 
 Private final consumption expenditure -  volume 5,0 4,9 3,9 4,1 
 Government final consumption expenditure -  volume 3,7 0,1 1,8 2,0 
 Exports of goods and services -  volume 9,1 6,5 1,3 1,9 
 Imports of goods and services -  volume 13,5 6,8 3,6 2,1 
 Unemployment rate - as a percentage of labor force 9,6 7,2 7,1 7,6 
 General government financial balance -  as a percentage of GDP -2,0 -2,3 -2,7 -2,9 
 Short-term interest rate - per cent, per annum 4,8 6,4 6,6 6,6 
 Consumer price index 2,5 4,2 3,2 3,6 
Source: OECD 
 
Exhibit 18 – Elements of the valuation  
The acquisition of Plus Discount in Poland would imply the sum of 210 stores with an 
average size of 700 square meters. However, it is expected that the Polish authority of 
competition imposes some limitations to this operation, thus it is estimated that the firm 
will have to dispose 25 of the Plus stores and also 15 of the current chain of Biedronka. 
This disposal will in turn provide approximately 15 million Euros. It is also important to 
notice that the stores will only be fully operative in the beginning of 2009, so it will not 
produce any income for Biedronka during 2008.  
Furthermore, the managers of Jerónimo Martins expect that the stores acquired will be 
able to achieve the operational level of Biedronka in no more than 3 years. This means 
that in this period the stores acquired will gradually increase their level of sales per sqm 
and their margins until they are the same as the stores of Biedronka. In exhibit 20 we 
can find the expectations about the rates of growth of these two indicators. The terminal 
growth of the free cash-flow of each store is expected to be 0.5% above inflation, which 
is estimated around 2%. The value of depreciation will be assumed to be 2% of total 
sales every year, and the taxes will remain constant at 19%.   
For the capital expenditures there are three different aspects. The first one is the capital 
spent on the restructuring of the Plus stores into Biedronka, which is 600 thousand 
zlotys for each one. The second aspect is the 2 million zlotys per store necessary to do 
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the revamping in every 7 years. The final element of the capex is the annual capital 
expenses necessary to maintain the capacity of the stores that are 600 thousand zlotys 
per year. The values of the changes in the net working capital for the Plus stores are 
shown in exhibit 21.  
The synergies of this operation can be calculated by comparing the effect on the 
margins with and without the Plus stores. We have to do this only for the years of 2009 
and 2010, since Jerónimo Martins expects that from 2011 the EBITDA margin will 
remain 6.5% forever. So by making the difference between the free cash-flow of the 
1100 stores, which is the number of stores expected to exist in the beginning of 2009, 
with and without Plus, we get the value of synergies. In exhibit 22 the differences 
between the margins are presented.  
Another important element of the valuation is the loss of the 15 Biedronka stores, since 
it represents the loss of the respective free cash-flow provided by them. For these stores 
the capital expenditures with the revamping and for maintaining the capacity of the 
stores is the same, but the changes in the net working capital are different (exhibit 23). 
Finally, there are two more elements that should be considered, the first one is the costs 
of non-recurrent nature of the acquisition of 10 million Euros, and the second is the 1 
million Euros for possible contingencies that may come up, like for example unexpected 
debts of the Plus stores, which should also be taken into account.  
Exhibit 19 – Elements of the valuation for 2009 
Despite the drastic change in the macroeconomic context, there are not expected 
significant changes in the rates of growth of the sales per square meter and of the 
EBITDA margins. In the exhibits 24 and 25 we can find the differences. All other 
elements, with the exception of the discount rate and of the spot exchange rate, remain 
the same as in the end of 2007. 
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Exhibit 20 - Sales per sqm & EBITDA margins 
Sales per sqm (zloty) 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008E 2009E 2010E 2011E 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 
Biedronka 13.400 14.500 14.900 16.100 18.600 21.204 22.688 24.276 25.733 27.020 28.100 29.225 30.393 31.609 32.399 
Variation - 8,21% 2,76% 8,05% 15,53% 14,00% 7,00% 7,00% 6,00% 5,00% 4,00% 4,00% 4,00% 4,00% 2,50% 
Plus 12.817 13.252 12.173 10.348 10.926 - 15.898 21.462 25.733 27.020 28.100 29.224 30.393 31.609 32.399 
Variation - 3,40% -8,15% -14,99% 5,59% - 45,50% 35,00% 19,90% 5,00% 4,00% 4,00% 4,00% 4,00% 2,50% 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 21 – Changes in NWC Plus stores (zlotys) 
 2009E 2010E 2011E 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 
Changes in NWC -400.000 -300.000 -160.000 -50.000 -35.000 -35.000 -35.000 -35.000 -20.000 
 
 
Exhibit 22 - Synergies 
With Plus 2009E 2010E 
Sales per sqm  22.688 24.276 
EBITDA margin  7,00% 6,80% 
 
Exhibit 23 – Changes in NWC Biedronka stores (zlotys) 
 2009E 2010E 2011E 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 
Changes in NWC -80.000 -80.000 -65.000 -50.000 -35.000 -35.000 -35.000 -35.000 -20.000 
EBITDA Margin 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008E 2009E 2010E 2011E 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 
Biedronka 4,90% 5,10% 5,35% 5,90% 6,10% 7,00% 6,80% 6,50% 6,50% 6,50% 6,50% 6,50% 6,50% 6,50% 
Plus - - - - - 4,50% 5,50% 6,50% 6,50% 6,50% 6,50% 6,50% 6,50% 6,50% 
Without Plus 2009E 2010E 
Sales per sqm  22.688 24.276 
EBITDA margin  6,25% 6,35% 
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Exhibit 24 – Sales per sqm and EBITDA margins 2009 
Sales per sqm (Zloty) 2008 2009E 2010E 2011E 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 
Biedronka 20.800 22.256 23.814 25.243 26.505 27.565 28.668 29.814 31.007 31.782 
Variation 12,00% 7,00% 7,00% 6,00% 5,00% 4,00% 4,00% 4,00% 4,00% 2,50% 
Plus - 15.297 21.110 25.243 26.505 27.565 28.668 29.814 31.007 31.782 
Variation - 40,00% 38,00% 19,58% 5,00% 4,00% 4,00% 4,00% 4,00% 2,50% 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 25 – Synergies 2009 
With Plus 2009E 2010E 
Sales per sqm 22.256 23.814 
EBITDA margin 7,00% 6,80% 
EBITDA margin estimatives 2008 2009E 2010E 2011E 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 
Biedronka 6,10% 7,00% 6,80% 6,50% 6,50% 6,50% 6,50% 6,50% 6,50% 6,50% 
Plus - 4,50% 5,50% 6,50% 6,50% 6,50% 6,50% 6,50% 6,50% 6,50% 
Without Plus 2009E 2010E 
Sales per sqm 22.256 23.814 
EBITDA margin 6,25% 6,35% 
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Exhibit 26 – Elements for the computation of the discount rate 
 Risk-free Return of the market Cost of debt Debt Equity 
2007   5,45% 
 
13,22% 6,53% 20% 80% 
2009 5,70% 11,90% 8,25% 20% 80% 
 
Risk-free – Polish Government bond from 6/10/06 until 25/10/17 
Return of the market – MSCI Europe index 
 
Firm D E D/E Beta eq. 07  Beta eq. 09  
Metro 55,24% 44,76% 123,41% 0,94  0,88  
Tesco 23,67% 76,33% 31,01% 0,88  0,92  
Carrefour 40,09% 59,91% 66,92% 0,77  0,76  
Casino 53,42% 46,58% 114,68% 0,71  0,81  
Ahold 30,24% 69,76% 43,35% 1,53  0,75  
Morrison 12,85% 87,15% 14,74% 1,01  0,77  
Emperia 28,80% 71,20% 40,45% 0,53  0,64  
 
 
Exhibit 27 – Exchange rate between the Zloty and the Euro 
  Zloty/Euro 
2007 0,279 
2008 0,286 
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Synopsis 
Since 1995 Poland has been a country where Jerónimo Martins has invested strongly, 
and despite the worse performance of Eurocash and Jumbo in this country, the fact is 
that Biedronka has been a huge success. To prove not only the strong bet on this 
country, but also the great achievement it has been, is the almost equal weight between 
the Portuguese and the Polish operations in terms of workers, sales and results  by the 
end of 2007 .      
Following this great success of Jerónimo Martins in Poland through the chain of stores 
Biedronka, the possibility of acquiring one of the direct competitors in the hard discount 
sector appeared. This competitor was Plus Discount and its owner, the German 
company Tengelmann, was interested in selling it due to the low success that it was 
achieving. This was an excellent opportunity to further strengthen the leading position 
in the hard discount sector.    
 
Teaching objectives 
This case can be used in a course of Mergers & Acquisitions. It introduces and 
discusses important factors that should be analyzed in an acquisition, not only the 
quantitative aspects of the valuation, but also some more qualitative questions related to 
the process of integration and the risks of the operation. It also gives the students a 
general idea of the different typical stages that an acquisition goes through. 
Furthermore, some insights concerning the strategy of internationalization of a firm and 
the process of restructure will also be given. 
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Suggested discussion questions  
1. Why did Jerónimo Martins decide to sell its operations in the British and in the 
Brazilian markets, as well as Eurocash and Jumbo in the Polish market? Why did it 
decide to maintain Biedronka?  
2. What were the main factors of success of Biedronka? 
3. Considering that the acquisition of Plus is more expensive than the organic growth, 
why would Jerónimo Martins prefer to do it, as opposed to continuing the organic 
expansion of the Biedronka stores?  
4. What should be the value proposed by Jerónimo Martins for Plus Discount? 
5. Taking into account the change in the macroeconomic context, revaluate the value 
proposed for Plus Discount. Why did not the expectations about the rates of growth of 
the sales suffer significant changes? 
 
Case analysis 
The analysis of this case study can be organized in four main categories: 
- Divestiture decision; 
- Success factors of an international expansion; 
- Organic growth vs. growth by acquisitions; 
- Business valuation.  
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1. Divestiture decision 
Why did Jerónimo Martins decide to sell its operations in the British and in the 
Brazilian markets, as well as Eurocash and Jumbo in the Polish market? Why did 
it decide to maintain Biedronka?  
The decision to sell the operations cannot be related directly to the success they were 
having at the time or not. In fact this choice was a result of many circumstances that 
happened at the same time and created a very rough context for the firm.  
At that time the world was suffering a severe crisis caused by the burst of the dot-com 
bubble, which led to high contractions of the economies and as a result affected the 
activities of the firms. Just some years before the beginning of this crisis, Jerónimo 
Martins decided to internationalize its operations in a very strong way. So when the 
crisis began, the company was highly exposed due to its presence in three different 
countries with five different new operations, which being in a launching phase were still 
presenting modest results. This fact was an extremely high financial burden for 
Jerónimo Martins and was affecting the company in a very significant way. On top of 
that was the contraction of the results of the firm in Portugal in consequence of the 
financial crisis.  
All these facts led to very serious financial problems at Jerónimo Martins that 
culminated with its inability to pay the interest of its debt. Therefore, the company 
decided to restructure the Group and refocus on a reduced number of businesses, which 
implied the sale of some of its operations, preferably the international ones that by being 
in an initial phase were consuming more financial resources than the already existing 
ones. This sale produced immediately a very important amount of cash-flow that was 
fundamental to solve the mentioned financial problems.      
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“…A sell-off produces the immediate benefits of an infusion of cash from the sale. The 
selling firm is selling a long-term asset, which generated a certain cash-flow per period, 
in exchange for a larger payment in the short-run. Companies that are under financial 
duress are often forced to sell off valuable assets to enhance cash-flows…” [1].  
The decision to maintain Biedronka can be simply justified by two reasons. The first 
one is the fact that among all five international operations, this was the one that was 
already showing better results, together with better perspectives for the future, created 
by not only the excellent economic perspectives for Poland, but also because the 
discount format seemed to be the one with better conditions to succeed. The second was 
that the sale of the other four operations was enough to solve the financial problems, 
making it unnecessary to also sell Biedronka.          
In conclusion, we cannot say that the decision to sell these operations was due to bad 
results or bad perspectives for them. It can be better justified by the need that Jerónimo 
Martins had at the time to reorganize its structure and to reduce the total number of 
operations it had, and by the urgency of an important cash inflow that could solve its 
very serious financial problems. 
 
2. Success factors of an international expansion 
What were the main factors of success of Biedronka? 
There are several factors that contributed to the success of Biedronka, some related to 
the characteristics of the Polish market, and others to the strategic decisions of Jerónimo 
Martins.    
The first factor is related to the specific conditions of Poland, which highly favoured the 
success of a discount format such as Biedronka. In this country salaries are low, so the 
price is the primary concern and the most decisive factor for the Polish when deciding 
where to go shopping for their groceries. Besides that, their houses and kitchens are 
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very small and therefore, due to this lack of space the Polish are not able to go to a 
super or hypermarket and buy the groceries they need for one or two weeks, instead 
they have to go shopping more frequently during that time, preferably somewhere near 
home. This preference is further accentuated by the small number of existing cars. 
Biedronka with its relatively small stores, 500 sqm in average, is capable of launching 
stores in the middle of the urban centers and very close to their customers, so the 
problem mentioned above is in fact an advantage when compared to the competitors 
with other formats.     
The pace at which Biedronka was able to open new stores was extremely important. The 
launching of 800 stores in ten years was fundamental to obtain a significant advantage 
in terms of scale over the competitors in the hard discount sector, Lidl, Netto and Plus 
Discount, which in the same period and all together opened around 600 stores. By being 
able to have a high number of stores, the firm is capable of achieving a high level of 
scale efficiency through economies of scale. This high number of stores is also very 
significant in the relation with the suppliers, since it gives the company a much higher 
bargaining power than a similar firm but with a lower number of stores. These two 
aspects are very important for the reduction of the general level of costs, which is vital 
to give the firm the possibility to practice lower prices than the competition. This is 
essential in the discount format where the price is the most valuable factor for the 
consumer.        
Another important factor was the timing of entry in the Polish market. When Jerónimo 
Martins expanded its operations to Poland there were several other firms that were 
doing the same. So despite not taking advantage of being a first-mover, it managed to 
benefit from the fact that it was starting its operations at the same time as the 
competition. If the operations had begun some years later, it is probable that the 
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implementation and the success of Biedronka could have been more difficult, due to the 
existence of other brands over a longer period of time.     
An additional factor was the strategy of communication that was very effective in the 
contact with the consumer, and in the transmission of the message of the lower prices 
practiced by Biedronka. With the slogan “everyday low prices” and other publicity 
campaigns, the firm has won some important Polish brand awards and is also an 
unquestionable leader as far as brand recognition is concerned. In surveys carried out on 
the Polish consumers it was confirmed that the brand Biedronka was by far considered 
to be the most recognized in the retail market.  
 
3. Organic growth vs. growth by acquisitions 
Considering that the acquisition of Plus is more expensive than the organic growth, 
why would Jerónimo Martins prefer to do it, as opposed to continuing the organic 
expansion of the Biedronka stores?  
There are two main reasons to make an acquisition. The first one is always present and 
is related to the value that the target firm will add to the acquirer, as well as the strategic 
benefits that the acquisition will bring, such as, less competition and a higher level of 
consolidation in the market. The second one is associated to the possibility of the target 
company to be acquired by a competitor. In this case the firm decides to make the 
acquisition not only because it will add value, but also to avoid the acquisition by a 
competitor. In the acquisition of Plus these two reasons are present and can be used to 
justify this operation.    
If one of the competitors of Biedronka acquires the chain of supermarkets Plus 
Discount, it will immediately add 210 stores and 150 thousand square meters to its 
chain. This could threaten the dominant position of Jerónimo Martins in the Polish 
market, since the competitor would instantly approach Biedronka in the area of sales 
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and potentially in the number of clients and sales. This fact gains even more importance 
in a retail market such as the Polish one, where the degree of competition is very high. 
If Biedronka ignores this opportunity, it may suffer in the future with a stronger 
competitor that could put more pressure on its position. “… As the company grows 
slowly through internal expansion, competitors may respond quickly and take market 
share. Advantages that a company may have can dissipate over time or be whittled 
away by the actions of the competitors…” [1]. 
Furthermore, we also have to highlight reasons that are connected to the value of Plus 
Discount. The previous argument applied to the competitors of Jerónimo Martins in 
Poland can also be used for Biedronka. If it moves towards the acquisition, it will add 
an important area of sales to its already significant chain of stores, so it would distance 
itself even more from the competition. We also have to consider that acquiring the 
stores instead of building them, despite being more costly, is much quicker. “…One of 
the most fundamental motives for mergers and acquisitions is growth. Companies 
seeking to expand are faced with a choice between internal growth and growth through 
mergers and acquisitions. Internal growth may be a slow and uncertain process. 
Growth through mergers and acquisitions may be a much more rapid process…” [1].  
With the acquisition, Biedronka has the almost immediate possibility of integrating the 
new stores into the old ones, and with that generating synergies that could amount to 
higher sales than the ones registered when the stores were property of Plus. This means 
that the potential of these stores can be higher when they are considered to be part of the 
chain of Biedronka. So when evaluating the situation, we must consider that the value 
added by Biedronka to the new stores is much higher than the one added by the 
competitors. 
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It is also very important to mention the importance of the synergies. With this 
acquisition Biedronka is capable of achieving synergies at the level of procurement, 
marketing and logistics, which will have a significant impact in the existing stores by 
raising sales and increasing their margins.     
Finally, another extremely important aspect is the possibility of eliminating one 
competitor. This would imply a higher degree of consolidation in the Polish retail 
market, which can allow for higher price stability and consequently better profit 
margins.    
 
4. Business valuation 
What should be the value proposed by Jerónimo Martins for Plus Discount? 
In order to reach a value for the chain Plus Discount, it is recommended the use of the 
Discounted Cash Flow approach: “…Enterprise DCF remains the favorite of many 
practitioners and academics because it relies solely on the flow of cash in and out of the 
company, rather than on accounting-based earnings (which can be misleading)…” [2]. 
However, to use this method for this case, several assumptions about the future cash-
flows of the firm must be made, like for example the growing rate of the sales per 
square meter, the EBITDA margins and the capital expenses for restructuring the stores, 
among others. Furthermore, there is also the need to compute a rate to discount the 
future cash-flows. To do this we must follow the weighted average cost of capital 
method: “…WACC based-models work best when a company maintains a relatively 
stable debt-to-value ratio…” [2], as it is going to be showed later, this is clearly the 
case of Jerónimo Martins.    
In the first step of the valuation we have to predict the rates of growth of both the sales 
per square meter and the EBITDA margin, not only for the Plus stores but also for the 
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ones of Biedronka. We do this using past information related with these two topics and 
the predictions made by Jerónimo Martins and other institutions. The high levels of 
growth that the stores of Biedronka are expected to achieve in the next ten years 
(Exhibit 1 of the teaching note) can be explained by several factors. The first one is the 
strong expectations of growth of the Polish economy, already explained in the case. The 
second one is related with the low level of consolidation of the Polish retail market, 
which represents an opportunity for further organic expansion and also consolidation for 
Biedronka. Also important are the expectations of the Poland market research that 
predicts that until 2011 the Polish grocery retail market will grow around 6%. Finally, 
the fact that 80% percent of sales of Biedronka are of food, imply a stable growth for 
the future without great oscillations. For the EBITDA margin it is expected that in 2011 
it will reach the 6.5% level, and that it will remain forever around this number.   
The expectations of Jerónimo Martins is that in three years the Plus stores will be able 
to reach an operational value similar to the ones of Biedronka, consequently, and as we 
can see in exhibit one, in 2011 these stores will already have the same values for the 
sales per sqm and for the EBITDA margin. It is also important to mention that during 
the year of 2008, it will be very difficult for the Plus stores to be operating under the 
Biedronka brand, since the decision of the Polish competition authority will take some 
considerable time, and also the restructuring of the stores will as well last for a while. 
So it can be predicted that for 2008 the Plus stores will not produce any income for 
Jerónimo Martins. 
Free cash-flow 
To achieve the value of the free cash-flow from the stores we have to compute their net 
income, add the value of the depreciation and subtract the capital expenditures and the 
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net working capital. All the computations mentioned to obtain the free cash-flow will be 
demonstrated in exhibit 2. 
In the computation of the net income the first thing to do is to calculate the total sales 
per store, which is done simply by multiplying the sales per square meter of each year 
by the average size of the Plus stores that is 700 sqm. Then we have to multiply the 
value by the EBITDA margin, in order to get the EBITDA for each store. To reach the 
value of EBIT we need to subtract the value of depreciation, which is assumed to be 2% 
of sales per store every year. Finally, by subtracting the value of taxes of 19% we get 
the net income in Zlotys. 
 In the next step the value of the depreciation must be added back to the net income. For 
the capital expenditures there are three different aspects. The first one is the capital 
spent on the restructuring of the Plus stores into Biedronka, which is 600 thousand 
zlotys for each one. The second aspect is the 2 million zlotys per store necessary to 
revamp the stores in every 7 years. By discounting these expenses with the WACC 
discount rate we get, in the end of 2008, the total showed in exhibit 3. The final element 
of the capex is the annual capital expenses necessary to maintain the capacity of the 
stores, which are 600 thousand zlotys per year. Finally, to reach the value of the free 
cash-flow, it is necessary to subtract the changes in the net working capital. Since 
Biedronka is in a particular industry were the cash cycle is negative and assuming that 
the average inventory period (22 days), the receivables period (5.5 days) and the 
payable period (68 days) will remain constant, the value of the changes in the net 
working capital will always remain negative and will vary according with the rate of 
growth of sales (exhibit 4). 
Now that we have obtained the free cash-flow from 2009 until 2017, we need to 
compute the terminal value, which will have a perpetual growth of 2.5%. This rate is 
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justified essentially by the great potential of the Polish economy and by the specificities 
of the Polish retail market that are very promising.  
Furthermore, to reach the present value for each year, all the values of the free cash-
flow in zlotys have to be discounted with the WACC discount rate. By adding all these 
present values we reach the total value of one typical store. After that, this value has to 
be multiplied by the total number of stores of Plus Discount that will be integrated. This 
number will not be 210 stores, due to the restrictions of the Polish authority of 
competition that will impose the sale 25 stores. To conclude, the total value of the free 
cash-flow has to be multiplied by the spot exchange rate from the zloty to the euro in 
the end of 2007.  
Synergies 
In the next step of the valuation we have to calculate the synergies of this operation. As 
explained in the case, the main synergy obtained with this acquisition is related with the 
increase of scale of the whole operation of Biedronka, which gives significant 
economies of scale that are very important to reduce the costs and increase the EBITDA 
margins. To measure the synergies we have to compare what would be the years of 
2009 and 2010, with and without the Plus stores. With the Plus stores the EBITDA 
margins would rise to 7 and 6.8% in 2009 and 2010 respectively, but without the stores 
they would be 6.25 and 6.35%. According to the expectations of Jerónimo Martins, 
from 2011 the EBITDA margin would be 6.5% for both cases. This variation in the 
margins has a significant impact in the free cash-flow of the 1100 stores that are 
estimated to exist in the beginning of 2009. Thus, we can estimate the synergies of the 
operation by computing the difference in free cash-flow of both scenarios. As shown in 
exhibit 5, the computations are similar to the ones in exhibit 2, being the only 
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differences the average size store that is 520 sqm and the changes in the net working 
capital. The final value of the synergies is 28.7 million Euros. 
Loss in the Biedronka stores 
Another important aspect in the valuation is the loss in the Biedronka stores that by 
imposition of the Polish competition authority have to be sold. The expectation is that 
15 stores will have to be disposed, so we have to include in the valuation the loss in the 
free cash-flow of each store. In exhibit 6 we can find this calculation. 
Other elements 
To conclude the valuation there are other elements that should be included. On the side 
of the revenues there is the cash-in provided by the sale of the Plus and Biedronka 
stores imposed by the Polish authority of competition, which is estimated to be around 
15 million Euros. On the side of the expenses we also have to take into account 10 
million zlotys in costs of non-recurrent nature, which among others will include the 
compensations paid to the Plus workers whose contracts will be terminated. There is 
also 1 million Euros for possible contingencies related to the Plus activities that may 
appear in the future. All these elements will be assumed to happen in the end of 2008, 
so they must be discounted.  
In exhibit 7 we can find all the computations mentioned above that lead to the final 
value of Plus Discount chain of stores of 226.6 million Euros.      
 
Taking into account the change in the macroeconomic context, revaluate the value 
proposed for Plus Discount. Why did not the expectations about the rates of 
growth of the sales suffer significant changes? 
Despite the drastic change in the macroeconomic context from the end of 2007 to the 
beginning of 2009, it is not expected significant changes in the forecasts made for the 
growth of the sales per sqm and for the EBITDA margins. This is justified by the 
40 
 
defensive portfolio of sales of Biedronka, which are composed by 80% of food, and also 
by the fact that it is a chain that operates exclusively in the hard discount format. This 
fact turns the economic crisis into an opportunity to offset a possible decline in the 
average basket consumed by a client, with an increasing number of clients captured 
from other competitors that operate in formats like the hyper or the supermarket.  
As a consequence, the expectations about the rates of growth remain unchanged. The 
only changes happen in the sales per sqm achieved in 2008 by Biedronka, which are not 
as high as expected in the end of 2007, and in the rate of growth of the Plus stores sales 
in 2009 and 2010. All these values are present in exhibit 8.   
In order to make the valuation in the beginning of 2009, we have to do the same steps as 
in question 4, but this time the exchange rate and the discount rate will be different due 
to the mentioned macroeconomic changes. However, the exchange rate used now will 
not be the nominal spot rate, it is necessary to make an adjustment in order for the rate 
to reflect the differences between the levels of inflation in both countries during the year 
of 2008. To do this the relative purchase parity power must be applied. So using this 
formula, 
€ 
= 
€ 
∗




, we reach the real exchange rate between the zloty 
and the euro in the end of 2008.   
In the first step things are done exactly the same way, being the only differences the 
changes in the rates of growth of the first years, the discount rate and the exchange rate. 
These same changes must also be applied to the synergies and to the loss in Biedronka 
stores. For all the other elements of the valuation the modifications are only related to 
the discount rate. From exhibit 8 to 12 we can observe all these computations.   
Finally, in exhibit 13 we find all the elements of the valuation together and the 
enterprise value of 284 million Euros. This value is significantly higher than the one for 
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the end of 2007, which is mainly justified by the real appreciation of the zloty against 
the euro and also by the decrease of the discount rate.   
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Exhibit 1 – Sales per sqm & EBITDA margins 
Sales per sqm (zloty) 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008E 2009E 2010E 2011E 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 
Biedronka 13.400 14.500 14.900 16.100 18.600 21.204 22.688 24.276 25.733 27.020 28.100 29.225 30.393 31.609 32.399 
Variation - 8,21% 2,76% 8,05% 15,53% 14,00% 7,00% 7,00% 6,00% 5,00% 4,00% 4,00% 4,00% 4,00% 2,50% 
Plus 12.817 13.252 12.173 10.348 10.926 - 15.898 21.462 25.733 27.020 28.100 29.224 30.393 31.609 32.399 
Variation - 3,40% -8,15% -14,99% 5,59% - 45,50% 35,00% 19,90% 5,00% 4,00% 4,00% 4,00% 4,00% 2,50% 
 
EBITDA Margin 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008E 2009E 2010E 2011E 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 
Biedronka 4,90% 5,10% 5,35% 5,90% 6,10% 7,00% 6,80% 6,50% 6,50% 6,50% 6,50% 6,50% 6,50% 6,50% 
Plus - - - - - 4,50% 5,50% 6,50% 6,50% 6,50% 6,50% 6,50% 6,50% 6,50% 
 
Exhibit 2 - Total FCF of the stores  
  2008E 2009E 2010E 2011E 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E Terminal value 
Sales per store (zlotys) - 11.128.411 15.023.355 18.013.003 18.913.653 19.670.199 20.457.007 21.275.287 22.126.298 22.679.456  
EBITDA - 500.778 826.285 1.170.845 1.229.387 1.278.563 1.329.705 1.382.894 1.438.209 1.474.165  
Depreciation - 222.568 300.467 360.260 378.273 393.404 409.140 425.506 442.526 453.589  
EBIT - 278.210 525.817 810.585 851.114 885.159 920.565 957.388 995.683 1.020.576  
Taxes - 52.860 99.905 154.011 161.712 168.180 174.907 181.904 189.180 193.909  
Net income - 225.350 425.912 656.574 689.403 716.979 745.658 775.484 806.504 826.666  
Depreciation - 222.568 300.467 360.260 378.273 393.404 409.140 425.506 442.526 453.589  
Capex 2.679.849 600.000 600.000 600.000 600.000 600.000 600.000 600.000 600.000 600.000  
Changes in NWC - -400.000 -300.000 -160.000 -50.000 -35.000 -35.000 -35.000 -35.000 -20.000  
FCF -2.679.849 247.919 426.379 576.834 517.676 545.383 589.798 635.990 684.030 700.255 9.462.245 
PV FCF -2.434.334 204.573 319.599 392.762 320.189 306.422 301.017 294.855 288.073 267.888 3.619.860 
Tot. FCF  3.880.905           
Tot. FCF stores 717.967.415           
Tot. FCF stores (euros) 200.097.518           
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Exhibit 3 – Capex Revamping (zlotys) 
 2015 2022 2029 2036 2043 2050 2057 2064 2071 
Capex Revamping 188.838.264 96.378.081 49.188.837 25.104.688 12.812.772 6.539.302 3.337.488 1.703.366 869.353 
Total 384.772.151         
 
Exhibit 4 – Changes in NWC (zlotys) 
 2009E 2010E 2011E 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 
Changes in NWC -400.000 -300.000 -160.000 -50.000 -35.000 -35.000 -35.000 -35.000 -20.000 
 
Exhibit 5 - Synergies 
With Plus 2009 2010 
Sales per sqm (zlotys) 22.688 24.276 
EBITDA margin  7,00% 6,80% 
Sales per store 11.797.906 12.623.759 
EBITDA 825.853 858.416 
Depreciation 235.958 252.475 
EBIT 589.895 605.940 
Taxes 112.080 115.129 
Net income 477.815 490.812 
Depreciation 235.958 252.475 
Capex 600.000 600.000 
Changes in NWC -80.000 -80.000 
FCF 193.773 223.287 
PV FCF 159.894 167.368 
Tot. FCF  327.263  
Tot. FCF stores 359.988.764  
Tot. FCF stores (euros) 100.328.869  
Without Plus  2009 2010 
Sales per sqm (zlotys) 22.688 24.276 
EBITDA margin  6,25% 6,35% 
Sales per store 11.797.906 12.623.759 
EBITDA 737.369 801.609 
Depreciation 235.958 252.475 
EBIT 501.411 549.134 
Taxes 95.268 104.335 
Net income 406.143 444.798 
Depreciation 235.958 252.475 
Capex 600.000 600.000 
Changes in NWC -80.000 -80.000 
FCF 122.101 177.273 
PV FCF 100.753 132.878 
Tot. FCF  233.631  
Tot. FCF stores 256.994.158  
Tot. FCF stores (euros) 71.624.272  
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Exhibit 6 – Loss in Biedronka stores 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Terminal Value 
Sales per store (zlotys) - 11.797.906 12.623.759 13.381.185 14.050.244 14.612.254 15.196.744 15.804.613 16.436.798 16.847.718  
EBITDA - 825.853 858.416 869.777 913.266 949.796 987.788 1.027.300 1.068.392 1.095.102  
Depreciation - 235.958 252.475 267.624 281.005 292.245 303.935 316.092 328.736 336.954  
EBIT - 589.895 605.940 602.153 632.261 657.551 683.853 711.208 739.656 758.147  
Taxes - 112.080 115.129 114.409 120.130 124.935 129.932 135.129 140.535 144.048  
Net income - 477.815 490.812 487.744 512.131 532.617 553.921 576.078 599.121 614.099  
Dep - 235.958 252.475 267.624 281.005 292.245 303.935 316.092 328.736 336.954  
Capex 2.079.849 600.000 600.000 600.000 600.000 600.000 600.000 600.000 600.000 600.000  
Changes in NWC - -80.000 -80.000 -65.000 -50.000 -35.000 -35.000 -35.000 -35.000 -20.000  
FCF -2.079.849 193.773 223.287 220.368 243.136 259.862 292.856 327.170 362.857 371.054 5.013.887 
PV FCF -1.889.303 159.894 167.368 150.047 150.383 146.003 149.466 151.681 152.814 141.950 1.918.104 
Tot. FCF 1.398.407           
Tot. FCF stores 20.976.102           
Tot. FCF stores (euros) 5.846.040           
 
Exhibit 7 – Enterprise Value 
 FCF stores Synergies Cash-in disposals Costs of non-recurrent nature Loss in Biedronka stores Contingencies 
 200.097.518 28.704.597 13.625.769 9.083.846 5.846.040 908.385 
Enterprise Value 226.589.614      
 
 
Exhibit 8 – Sales per sqm and EBITDA margins 2009 
Sales per sqm (Zloty) 2008 2009E 2010E 2011E 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 
Biedronka 20.800 22.256 23.814 25.243 26.505 27.565 28.668 29.814 31.007 31.782 
Variation 12,00% 7,00% 7,00% 6,00% 5,00% 4,00% 4,00% 4,00% 4,00% 2,50% 
Plus - 15.297 21.110 25.243 26.505 27.565 28.668 29.814 31.007 31.782 
Variation - 40,00% 38,00% 19,58% 5,00% 4,00% 4,00% 4,00% 4,00% 2,50% 
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EBITDA margin estimatives 2008 2009E 2010E 2011E 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 
Biedronka 6,10% 7,00% 6,80% 6,50% 6,50% 6,50% 6,50% 6,50% 6,50% 6,50% 
Plus - 4,50% 5,50% 6,50% 6,50% 6,50% 6,50% 6,50% 6,50% 6,50% 
 
 
Exhibit 9 - Total FCF of the stores 2009 
  2008 2009E 2010E 2011E 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E Terminal value 
Sales per store - 10.707.749 14.776.694 17.669.971 18.553.470 19.295.608 20.067.433 20.870.130 21.704.935 22.247.558  
EBITDA - 481.849 812.718 1.148.548 1.205.976 1.254.215 1.304.383 1.356.558 1.410.821 1.446.091  
Depreciation - 214.155 295.534 353.399 371.069 385.912 401.349 417.403 434.099 444.951  
EBIT - 267.694 517.184 795.149 834.906 868.302 903.034 939.156 976.722 1.001.140  
Taxes - 50.862 98.265 151.078 158.632 164.977 171.577 178.440 185.577 190.217  
Net income - 216.832 418.919 644.070 676.274 703.325 731.458 760.716 791.145 810.924  
Depreciation - 214.155 295.534 353.399 371.069 385.912 401.349 417.403 434.099 444.951  
Capex 2.983.374 600.000 600.000 600.000 600.000 600.000 600.000 600.000 600.000 600.000  
Changes in NWC - -400.000 -300.000 -160.000 -50.000 -35.000 -35.000 -35.000 -35.000 -20.000  
FCF -2.983.374 230.987 414.453 557.470 497.343 524.237 567.807 613.119 660.244 675.875 10.553.641 
PV NFCF -2.983.374 211.790 348.426 429.708 351.501 339.715 337.369 334.016 329.795 309.544 4.833.472 
Tot. NFCF  4.841.961           
Tot. NFCF stores 895.762.745           
Tot. NFCF stores (euros) 255.840.770           
 
Exhibit 10 – Capex Revamping 2009 (zlotys) 
  2015 2022 2029 2036 2043 2050 2057 2064 2071 
Capex Revamping 201.568.985 109.810.962 59.822.930 32.590.398 17.754.631 9.672.386 5.269.333 2.870.633 1.563.866 
Total 440.924.123         
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Exhibit 11 – Synergies 2009 
With Plus 2009E 2010E 
Sales per sqm  22.256 23.814 
EBITDA margin  7,00% 6,80% 
Sales per store 11.573.120 12.383.238 
EBITDA 810.118 842.060 
Depreciation 231.462 247.665 
EBIT 578.656 594.395 
Taxes 109.945 112.935 
Net income 468.711 481.460 
Depreciation 231.462 247.665 
Capex 600.000 600.000 
Changes in NWC -80.000 -80.000 
FCF 180.174 209.125 
PV FCF 165.200 175.809 
Tot. FCF  341.009  
Tot. FCF stores 375.109.389  
Tot. FCF stores (euros) 107.135.819  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Without Plus 2009E 2010E 
Sales per sqm  22.256 23.814 
EBITDA margin  6,25% 6,35% 
Sales per store 11.573.120 12.383.238 
EBITDA 723.320 786.336 
Dep 231.462 247.665 
EBIT 491.858 538.671 
Taxes 93.453 102.347 
Net income 398.405 436.323 
Depreciation 231.462 247.665 
Capex 600.000 600.000 
Changes in NWC -80.000 -80.000,00 
FCF 109.867 163.988,17 
PV FCF 100.736 137.863 
Tot. FCF  238.599  
Tot. FCF stores 262.458.834  
Tot. FCF stores (euros) 74.961.446  
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Exhibit 12 – Loss in Biedronka Stores 2009 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Terminal Value 
Sales per store   11.797.906 12.623.759 13.381.185 14.050.244 14.612.254 15.196.744 15.804.613 16.436.798 16.847.718   
EBITDA   825.853 858.416 869.777 913.266 949.796 987.788 1.027.300 1.068.392 1.095.102   
Depreciation   235.958 252.475 267.624 281.005 292.245 303.935 316.092 328.736 336.954   
EBIT   589.895 605.940 602.153 632.261 657.551 683.853 711.208 739.656 758.147   
Taxes   112.080 115.129 114.409 120.130 124.935 129.932 135.129 140.535 144.048   
Net income   477.815 490.812 487.744 512.131 532.617 553.921 576.078 599.121 614.099   
Depreciation   235.958 252.475 267.624 281.005 292.245 303.935 316.092 328.736 336.954   
Capex 2.383.374 600.000 600.000 600.000 600.000 600.000 600.000 600.000 600.000 600.000   
Changes in NWC - -80.000 -80.000 -65.000 -50.000 -35.000 -35.000 -35.000 -35.000 -20.000   
FCF -2.383.374 193.773 223.287 220.368 243.136 259.862 292.856 327.170 362.857 371.054 5.793.925 
PV FCF -2.383.374 177.669 187.715 169.864 171.838 168.395 174.004 178.236 181.249 169.939 2.653.565 
Tot. FCF  1.849.100           
Tot. FCF stores 27.736.498           
Tot. FCF stores (euros) 7.921.882           
 
 
 
Exhibit 13 – Enterprise value 2009 
 FCF stores Synergies Cash-in disposals Costs of non-recurrent nature Loss in Biedronka stores Contingencies 
 255.840.770 32.174.373 15.000.000 10.000.000 7.921.882 1.000.000 
Enterprise Value 284.093.261      
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Exhibit 14 – WACC 2007 & 2009 
The first step in the computation of the discount rate is the definition of the respective 
weights of the equity and of the debt of the company. For Jerónimo Martins the targets 
for the long run are 80% of equity and 20% of debt. Then, we need the values of the 
cost of debt and of the cost of equity. For the cost of debt we have to know the rate that 
Jerónimo Martins was paying for its debt in the final of 2007, which was 6.53%. For the 
cost of equity we have to use the CAPM model.  
 The inputs for this model are the risk-free, the beta of the company and the return of the 
market. For the risk-free we will use the Poland Government bond, because it expresses 
better the risk subjacent to this country. Using the Government bond beginning on the 
6
th
 of October of 2006 and maturing on the 25
th
 of October of 2017, we can make an 
average of the values of the yield from October of 2006, until the end of 2007, which 
gives us the value for the risk-free of 5,45%. For the beta we will use an industry beta 
composed by the comparables presented in exhibit 15. The first step to reach the beta is 
to get all the equity betas of the seven companies, provided from monthly data from the 
end of 2002 until the end of 2007. Next by using this formula,  = (1 +


), we get 
the beta unlevered for each firm. After that we have to make an average of those betas, 
and using again that formula with the capital structure of Jerónimo Martins we get a 
beta equity of 0.75. The return of the market is calculated from historical data of the 
MSCI Europe index. By making an arithmetic average of the annual returns from 1969 
until 2007 of this index, we reach the value of 13.22%. Now that we have all the inputs 
needed for the CAPM, we just have to use the model and get the value of 11.28% for 
the cost of equity.  
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To finish we have to apply the WACC formula: 


∗  ∗ (1 − ") +


∗ , where T is the 
Polish tax rate of 19%. The value we get for the discount rate in the end of 2007 is 
10.09%.  
For the 2009 discount rate the process is exactly the same, but the date used previously 
must be updated in order to reflect the conditions in the beginning of this year. The cost 
of debt rose considerably and is now 8.25%. For the risk-free we will use the same 
Government bond, however now we need to include the values of the yield in the year 
of 2008, which gives us a new risk-free of 5.7%. The beta will also be changed to 0.64, 
since now the data goes from the end of 2003 to the end of 2008. For the return of the 
market we need to add the year of 2008 to the average made previously, so due to the 
really weak year of the stock markets, the value will decrease to 11.9%. Now that all the 
values for the WACC are available we can reach the discount rate for 2009, which is 
9.06%.   
 
Exhibit 15 – Comparables betas 
Firm D E D/E Beta eq. 07 Beta unlev. 07 Beta eq. 09 Beta unlev. 09 
Metro 55,24% 44,76% 123,41% 0,94 0,42 0,88 0,40 
Tesco 23,67% 76,33% 31,01% 0,88 0,67 0,92 0,70 
Carrefour 40,09% 59,91% 66,92% 0,77 0,46 0,76 0,46 
Casino 53,42% 46,58% 114,68% 0,71 0,33 0,81 0,38 
Ahold 30,24% 69,76% 43,35% 1,53 1,07 0,75 0,52 
Morrison 12,85% 87,15% 14,74% 1,01 0,88 0,77 0,67 
Emperia 28,80% 71,20% 40,45% 0,53 0,38 0,64 0,45 
 
 
Exhibit 16 – Exchange rates 
  Zloty/Euro 
2007 0,279 
2008 0,286 
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